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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PHYLLIS ADAM80N \ 
Plaintiff and Appellant ( 
f~DDIB~ JO~J AD~~~80N ( 
Defendant and Respondent } 
RRTEF OF RE8PONDEN11 
STATF~MENT OF FACTS 
CasP No. 
1108:3 
Tlw statement of fact in plaintiff-appellant hrief 
ap1wars to eonform to thP rPeord, and is a eorrect state-
nwnt of farts with respert to orders entered and dates of 
hearing- on the varions matters in this ease. Defendant-
n•spondent refers thP court to pag-<' ~ of plaintiff-appel-
lant's hrief, wlwrein plaintiff-appellant refers to a motion 
to interplead. This motion was made b~· plaintiff's attor-
n<'y approximately eight months aftt>r dt>rt>ase of thP 
plaintiff, and plaintiff's attorne~· at that time attempted 
to havt> an ord<'r ent<->red rr>verting hark to De>ct>mher 29, 
J 9<iG which would havP granted the plaintiff's attorney 
thP right to interplead as of two days prior to the death 
of thP plaintiff in this adion. 
2 
RTATEMENT OF POINT I 
Plaintiff's attorney did not have an assignment from 
})laintiff in this divorce action and did not at an>- time 
gain any right by interpleader in the action. An attorne~' 
is not a party to the action, and any order or dt>rreP 
running in favor of the attorney with respect to attorney's 
fpes is void. Plaintiff's attorney does not have a judg-
ment lien in this case now before the court, and doPs 
not have a right to enforce the same by garnishment or 
execution. 
ARGFMENT 
Plaintiff's attorney is attempting to establish a right 
1o attorney's fees and maintains that tht>re is a judgment 
lien in favor of plaintiff's attorney by reason of various 
orders made by the trial court, even though plaintiff's 
attorney was never a party to this action now before the 
f'ourt. 
Defendant-appellant cites the case of Rolando vs. thr 
District Co11rt of Salt Lake County, 72 lT 4fi9, 271 P 
225, wherein it was stated: 
"Order that defendant in divorce action have judg-
ment for benefit of defendant's attorneys on attor-
ney's motion for additional attorneys' fN•s held 
void· attorneys not b!-'ing parti•·s.'' ' -
3 
.Justice Cherry, writing tlw majority opinion in t1H· 
Rolando ease, stated: 
"We think it clear that the attornevs in whosP 
favor the order was made wert> not p'arties to tlw 
action, and were not made such hv their surnrnan 
motion. There are proceedings. hv whieh addi-
tional persons may proper!~· he hro~1ght in as par-
ties to actions, notwithstanding the objections of 
one or both of original parties, hut until sneh is 
ordered by the court, the jurisdiction of the court 
is limited to the claims of the parties hefort> it 
for and against each other. For this rt>a~mn, the 
order complained of was without jurisdiction and 
void.'' 
In thP <·as(' of Ownsh11w rs. Openslwu:. 1:2 P2 ~G-1-. 
it is statPd: 
"Jn divorces ease, the decre(:' directing dPf endant 
to pa~' to p1aintiff's attorn(:'~· (•ertain sum, hP!d 
void because running in favor of attornPy, not 
party to action." (Citing Rolando vs. Distrid 
Court of Ptah, 72 rtah 459, 271 P 225 ). 
It is furtlwr stat(:'d, "Deere(:' awarding fres for plain-
tiff's attorne~· in divorrP case should nm in favor of 
plaintiff." 
In the opinion of thP Openshaw case, written h~- Dil-
\rn rth V.7olle~·. Distrirt .TndgP, it stah•d: 
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"As to th_e attorney's fpps, it appears that prior 
to the trial, defendant, under the onler of t!JC• 
rourt, had paid to his wife or to her attornrv on 
account of his fees, the sum of $100. rriwn, a·t' t!it• 
conclusion of the trial, the court, heino- of thP 
• • h 
opm1on that $500 was a reasonable amount to lw 
paid to plaintiff's attorney for his ~wrvirPs in tlw 
rase, and that the dPfend~nt ought to pay it lw-
rause plaintiff rould not, in the deeree orderPd 
and directed defendant to pay to plaintiff's attor-
ney an additional sum of $400, in statPd install-
nwnts. rrhe point madP is that t}H• deel'eP in t\1is 
r0spect is void hf•eans(, it runs in fa\-or of tlw 
attorney, who is not a part~· to the action. 'l'hP 
point is well taken. A de<•r(•e in favor of a pPrson 
who is not a party to tlw aC'tion or proeel·ding, is 
void, because the eonrt has no jnrisdietion to mah 
it." (Citing <'nSPS). 
l<'urthPr eitinµ: Ftah <·asPs, arnl with res1wet to tltP 
<'laim of a jndJ..,11nent liPn for attorneys' fees, def'Pndant-
l'PspondPnt ritPs thP rasP of All>rerhtsen 1'"" All>rerhfs1"11 .. 
-1-14 P~ 970. in whirh it is stah•<l: 
''Proper procedure would have lwen for wife's 
attorney to intervene in her divorre action to Jiay1• 
amount and extent of his attorneys liPn detf'r-
rnined and lien enforced, and having failed to 
intervene, hP had no standing to appeal frolll 
a r ti on of eourt in garnislmwnt prorePding-s 
brought in that rasP, evPn though motion to quash 
writ was supportPd by wife's affidavit that issu-
ance of writ had not het~n authoriz<'d hy lwr, and 
that attorney had been paid." 
5 
It appean; to lw a genPral and univ<"n..;al rnlP in tlH· 
UnitPd StatPs that an order or decree ordering pa~1w,nt 
of attornP»'s fees directly to tlw attornev i8 invalid and 
mid, and counsel for defrndant-respondPnt has hPen un-
able to find any rasps holding to the contrary. 
W <' invite the court's attention to a few (•asps from 
<itlwr jurisdictions and the langnage eontainPd thPrPin. 
In tlw ease of Hart 11ack ns.H art nack, 70 N PW .J Prse~·. 
~11per ;-) 1 :1. 17G A2 27<1. thP <'On rt stah•d as follows: 
"An application for the allowancP of eounsPI fees 
and eosts made hy counsel for thP wife in an action 
against her hushancl is made in lwr lwhalf and, if 
awarded, must he awarded to her." 
In thP ease of Bell 1·s. Rell, 214 Alabama ;)l:i, 10~ 
~onth :)7:\ the eonrt stated: 
"An attorney in a divorcP procePding has no sep-
arate equity to counsel fees hnt must deriw it 
from his elient." 
ln the case of BNtch rs. Beach, 99 Ohio Appeals 428, 
1 ~() NT<:2 164, a <livorr<-' ]ffOCPP<ling, tlw court rPf ers to 
an Ohio statnfr. and statPs as follm\-s: 
"Gnder the Ohio statute providing that the court 
may grant 'alimony' to PithPr of thP partiPs for 
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sustenancf> and t>xrwnses dnring the suit, tlw rourt 
may award the wifr a snm as attorn<'~·'s f pes, hnt 
an order that thP fees be paid dir<'ctlv to tlw 
attorney is invalid, and thP husband's .violation 
of it is not punishable as r,ontempt." 
Plaintiff's attorne~· in statement of facts in apprl-
Jant's brief sPts ont the wording of an ordt>r as a rPfmlt of 
the hearing held on N ov<>mber 23, 19GG, said wording 
lwing as follows: "Dt>fendant is ordert>d to pa~- plaintiff'~ 
attorney thf> snrn of $;)0 as temporary attorne~·'s fees." 
( R. 11, 12). Conrnwl for dPfendant-respondt>nt suhmit:-
that in spite of the "·ording, the ordPr is not for paynwnt 
di rectl~- to plaintiff's attornPy, and is not an order whiel1 
plaintiff's attorm•y may now <>nfor<'<> by garnishrnent or 
l'X<'t'Htion. 
lt~ ~otlbf~ 
In snpport of this <'Ontention, eounsel for 3'flfWll!Wltl 
<'ih•s the case of J/ cl>n11ald rs. J/ cDonald. 124 ~lontana 
2G, 21S P2 929. which states as follows: 
"'rht> fact that thP order di reets the payment to 
plaintiff's attorney rather than to plaintiff, is an 
irrPgnlarity merPly which does not affrd any 
substantial right of thP <lefendant." 
All of tlwsP easese hen•in eitt>d would also rebut tlw 
rontention of plaintiff's attorney madP on pagE' 4 of 
ap1wllant's briPf, whPrPin it is elaimt>d that, "If tlw attor-
TIPV is in faet tlw judgment en'ditor sine\:' l1t· is tlw ow 
fo~ whose hPnefit the judrnt>nt is grantt><l, tht>n lw is till' 
pro1wr pinh· for issn:rn<'t> of that \\Tit." 
7 
All of the caseH citl'd hy tlw respondent would indi-
ratP that tlw attornPy is not a party to thl' action, and 
lw is not the proper party to ohtain iHsuanC'P of writ. 
STA 'l'KMEN'l' OF POTN'l' TT 
An attempted comparison of onr statute, 30-3-3, Utah 
('ndl' Annotated 1%3, with New York statute set forth 
in Appellant's hrief, is not proper, since the wording of 
tliPse two statntl's is diff Pr(mt, and the Utah statute does 
not indiC'atP, dirPctly or hy irnpliC'ation, that attorney's 
frps should he paid directly to plaintiff's attorm·~·. 
Th(• N C'W York statutP eitPd h~· appPllant states m 
part, "Sneh dirPction must lw made in the final jndgirwnt 
in such art ion." 
1'lH• New York <'Onrt, in making a ruling on the ease 
eitrd h)· the appellant, appellant's hrief, page 5, and 
rPforring to thP statnte, stated in part: "'l'hP final judg-
ltlPnt of sPparation in this casP J>ro,·idPs for dirPrt pay-
lllPnt h.'· thP lrnshand to tlw wifp'f:; attorneys." 
Our statute d<ws not rontain tlw language .inst sPt 
i'(Jrth as is contairn--d in tlw NP\\' York i-;tatut<> and, 
l'YPn if it did, WP hasfrn to point out that hoth thP statute 
and tl1P wording of tlw N(•w York easP rPf Prs to final 
.iudgrnent, and had thP rtah eourt ordP1wl a sum paid into 
1liP <'l<'rk for tht> wif P and ('hildrPn, said sum would havP 
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been for the wife and children and not for plaintiff's 
attorney. 
It is respedfull~' snhmitted that the plaintiff's coun-
sel did not at any time have an assignment executed by 
his client, thP plaintiff-appPllant in this easP. Plaintiff':; 
counsel never hecarne a party to the action hy intN-
pleader, and any order for payment of attorney's flies 
directly to plaintiff's attorney is invalid and void, an<l 
it would be improper to order payment of attorney's frp~ 
to the clerk of the court for thP benefit of plaintiff's 
attorney. The order appealt>d from should lw affirrnr<l. 
Don 1'~. Hammill, for 
DANSIE, ELLE'TT AND 
HAMMILL 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
